

Amherst College Department of Mathematics and Statistics

Math 252

MIDTERM 2

Spring 2020

NAME:

Read This First!

- The exam is due on Gradescope at Wednesday, April 29 at 10pm Eastern time.
- The exam is open-book and open-notes. You may also freely consult my online lecture notes and anything on the course webpage.
- You may not discuss the problems with anyone except the instructor or Q Center staff. You are free to ask the instructor clarifying questions. You may discuss your solutions with Q Center staff if you wish, but they will not give substantial hints or suggestions.
- You may not ask these questions on any websites or search for solutions online.
- Please read each question carefully. Show **ALL** work clearly.
- In order to receive full credit on a problem, solution methods must be complete, logical and understandable.
- You may cite any theorems proved in class or on the homework in your proofs, except in cases where the statement to be proved is essentially the same as a theorem proved earlier. In that case you should write out the full proof. Please ask me if you are uncertain about whether you should prove a theorem or if it is enough to cite it.
- Please write solutions to each problem on a separate page. Include all of your scratchwork in your scanned document. Any pages of scratchwork that you do not want graded should still be included; put these at the back of your scanned file, and label them as "scratchwork."

Question:	1	2	3	4	Total
Points:	12	12	12	12	48
Score:					

Grading	_	For	Instructor	\mathbf{Use}	Only
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- 0. Write out the following sentence, and sign your name: "The attached work is entirely my own. I have not discussed the problems with anyone except course staff, and have not attempted to find solutions online." (This page does not need to be labelled with a problem on Gradescope.)
- 1. [12 points] Alice and Bob are using RSA encryption. Alice publishes the following public key.

$$N = 64777$$
$$e = 11$$

Bob sends the following ciphertext to Alice.

c = 42675

Use a brute-force approach to extract Alice's private key and determine Bob's plaintext *m*. You should use a computer for the computations, but clearly explain what you have done and how you have used the computer to do it.

2. [12 points] Let E be the elliptic curve over \mathbb{Q} (EDIT: you can just think of this as a curve over \mathbb{R} ; the result will be the same) defined by the equation

$$y^2 = x^3 - x + 1$$

Let P be the point (1, 1). Determine the point $(-3) \cdot P$. Do the arithmetic by hand, and show your computations (but you may use a computer to check your arithmetic).

3. [12 points] Suppose that Samantha and Victor use the following variation on DSA. The system uses the same public parameters p, q, g as DSA (notation as in Table 4.3 of the textbook). Rather that publishing a single verification key A, Samantha chooses *two* secret signing keys a_1, a_2 , and publishes two verification keys A_1, A_2 such that

$$A_1 \equiv g^{a_1} \pmod{p}, \text{ and} A_2 \equiv g^{a_2} \pmod{p}.$$

A signature on a document D consists of a pair of integers (S_1, S_2) . When he receives a document D with signature (S_1, S_2) , Victor will use the following verification procedure.

- Compute $V_1 \equiv DS_2^{-1} \pmod{q}$ and $V_2 \equiv S_1S_2^{-1} \pmod{q}$ (as in DSA).
- Verify that

$$\left((A_1^{V_1} A_2^{V_2})\% p \right) \% q = S_1.$$

(If this equation is false, the signature is considered invalid.)

Devise an (efficient) signing procedure that Samantha could follow to produce valid signatures. Write out your procedure as a Python function (receiving a document D and the parameters and private keys as input), and prove that your program returns a valid signature according to Victor's procedure above.

I will not deduct points for syntax errors, as long as it is clear what you mean. You may use the built-in Python function **pow** for fast modular powers, and you may assume that you have implemented an efficient function **modinv** to compute modular inverses. *EDIT: you may also* make use of any functions from the **random** library to generate random numbers. Any other needed helper functions should be implemented in your written solution. 4. This problem concerns an adaptation of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).

Suppose that E is an elliptic curve over $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, and $P \in E$ is a point of order 143. Note that 143 factors as $11 \cdot 13$. Suppose that Q is another point on the curve, and that Eve wishes to find an integer n such that $n \cdot P = Q$.

Define four more points on E as follows.

$$P_1 = 13 \cdot P$$

$$Q_1 = 13 \cdot Q$$

$$P_2 = 11 \cdot P$$

$$Q_2 = 11 \cdot Q$$

- (a) [4 points] Prove that $\operatorname{ord}_E(P_1) = 11$ and $\operatorname{ord}_E(P_2) = 13$.
- (b) [6 points] Suppose $Q \in E$ is another point on the curve, and that $n_1, n_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ are integers such that $n_1 \cdot P_1 = Q_1$ and $n_2 \cdot P_2 = Q_2$. Prove that if an integer n satisfies $n \cdot P = Q$ then n must satisfy the following two congruences.

$$n \equiv n_1 \pmod{11}$$
$$n \equiv n_2 \pmod{13}$$

(The converse is also true, but you do not need to prove it).

(c) [2 points] Briefly explain why part (b) may be useful to Eve in her attempt to solve $n \cdot P = Q$.

Please remember to include all your scratchwork in your scanned document, even pages you do not wish to have graded. These pages do not need to be labelled to a problem when submitting on Gradescope.