Note: this exam was an open-book and open-notes take-home exam.

1. [12 points] Alice and Bob are using RSA encryption. Alice publishes the following public key.

$$N = 64777$$
$$e = 11$$

Bob sends the following ciphertext to Alice.

$$c = 42675$$

Use a brute-force approach to extract Alice's private key and determine Bob's plaintext m. You should use a computer for the computations, but clearly explain what you have done and how you have used the computer to do it.

2. [12 points] Note (2024): our Midterm 2 will not cover Elliptic curves, so you can skip this question. You may want to return to it to review for the final exam. Let E be the elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{R}$  defined by the equation

$$y^2 = x^3 - x + 1.$$

Let P be the point (1,1). Determine the point  $(-3) \cdot P$ . Do the arithmetic by hand, and show your computations (but you may use a computer to check your arithmetic).

3. [12 points] Suppose that Samantha and Victor use the following variation on DSA. The system uses the same public parameters p, q, g as DSA (notation as in Table 4.3 of the textbook). Rather that publishing a single verification key A, Samantha chooses *two* secret signing keys  $a_1, a_2$ , and publishes two verification keys  $A_1, A_2$  such that

$$A_1 \equiv g^{a_1} \pmod{p}, \text{ and} A_2 \equiv g^{a_2} \pmod{p}.$$

A signature on a document D consists of a pair of integers  $(S_1, S_2)$ . When he receives a document D with signature  $(S_1, S_2)$ , Victor will use the following verification procedure.

- Compute  $V_1 \equiv DS_2^{-1} \pmod{q}$  and  $V_2 \equiv S_1S_2^{-1} \pmod{q}$  (as in DSA).
- Verify that

$$\left( (A_1^{V_1} A_2^{V_2}) \% p \right) \% q = S_1.$$

(If this equation is false, the signature is considered invalid.)

Devise an (efficient) signing procedure that Samantha could follow to produce valid signatures. Write out your procedure as a Python function (receiving a document D and the parameters and private keys as input), and prove that your program returns a valid signature according to Victor's procedure above.

I will not deduct points for syntax errors, as long as it is clear what you mean. You may use the built-in Python function **pow** for fast modular powers, and you may assume that you have implemented an efficient function **modinv** to compute modular inverses. *EDIT: you may also make use of any functions from the random library to generate random numbers.* Any other needed helper functions should be implemented in your written solution. 4. This problem concerns an adaptation of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP).

Suppose that E is an elliptic curve over  $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ , and  $P \in E$  is a point of order 143. Note that 143 factors as  $11 \cdot 13$ . Suppose that Q is another point on the curve, and that Eve wishes to find an integer n such that  $n \cdot P = Q$ .

Define four more points on E as follows.

$$P_1 = 13 \cdot P$$

$$Q_1 = 13 \cdot Q$$

$$P_2 = 11 \cdot P$$

$$Q_2 = 11 \cdot Q$$

- (a) [4 points] Prove that  $\operatorname{ord}_E(P_1) = 11$  and  $\operatorname{ord}_E(P_2) = 13$ .
- (b) [6 points] Suppose  $Q \in E$  is another point on the curve, and that  $n_1, n_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$  are integers such that  $n_1 \cdot P_1 = Q_1$  and  $n_2 \cdot P_2 = Q_2$ . Prove that if an integer n satisfies  $n \cdot P = Q$  then n must satisfy the following two congruences.

$$n \equiv n_1 \pmod{11}$$
$$n \equiv n_2 \pmod{13}$$

(The converse is also true, but you do not need to prove it).

(c) [2 points] Briefly explain why part (b) may be useful to Eve in her attempt to solve  $n \cdot P = Q$ .